Ryther v. KARE II and the Eighth Circuit Standard for Summary Judgment in Age Discrimination Cases by Tambornino, Katherine
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 26 | Issue 4 Article 7
2000
Ryther v. KARE II and the Eighth Circuit Standard
for Summary Judgment in Age Discrimination
Cases
Katherine Tambornino
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Tambornino, Katherine (2000) "Ryther v. KARE II and the Eighth Circuit Standard for Summary Judgment in Age Discrimination
Cases," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 26: Iss. 4, Article 7.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss4/7
RYTHER V. KARE 11 AND THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN AGE
DISCRIMINATION CASES
Katherine Tamborninot
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1104
II. BACKGROUND: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT STANDARD ........ 1107
A. The McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting Approach ...... 1108
B. The Hicks Clarification ofMcDonnell Douglas ........... 1110
III. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT SPLIT POST-HICKS ............................. 1112
A. Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp .............. 1113
B. Rothmeier v. Investment Advisors, Inc ..................... 1115
IV. RYTHER V. KARE Il ........................................................... 1116
A . T he Facts .................................................................. 1116
B . The D ecision .............................................................. 1117
C. The M ajority Opinion ...................................................... 1118
1. Application of the McDonnell Douglas Standard ..... 1119
2. The Standard forJudgment as a Matter of Law .......... 1120
D. The Dissenting Opinion .............................................. 1120
1. Application of the McDonnell Douglas Standard ..... 1121
2. The Standard for Judgment as a Matter of Law .......... 1121
E . A nalysis .................................................................... 1122
V. APPLICATION OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT STANDARD POST-
R YTH ER ................................................................................. 1123
A. The "Pretext-Only" Standard ........................................ 1123
B. The "Pretext-Plus" Standard ........................................ 1124
C. Eighth Circuit Cases Post-Ryther ..................................... 1125
D. Stanback v. Best Diversified Products, Inc ................ 1128
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION ................................................ 1131
A. The Standard for Summary Judgment and Ryther .......... 1132
V II. C O NCLUSION ........................................................................ 1133
1103
t J.D. candidate 2001, William Mitchell College of Law.
1
Tambornino: Ryther v. KARE II and the Eighth Circuit Standard for Summary Jud
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
The Eighth Circuit opinions in age discrimination cases on appeal
from summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law have been
inconsistent in recent years.' One reason is that the standard for summary
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 does not fit neatly
with the circumstantial nature of proof in age discrimination cases.
Further, the burden-shifting approach of producing evidence in age
discrimination cases, first outlined in the U.S. Supreme Court decision
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,' highlights the he-said/she-said character
1. See infra Part III, Part V. The Eighth Circuit is not alone in this conflict.
As one article opined:
The federal courts of appeals disagree on the amount of evidence that an
employee must present in employment discrimination cases to survive an
employer's motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of
law. The First Circuit, the Second Circuit en banc, the Fifth Circuit en
banc, and the Eighth Circuit en banc hold that to survive an employer's
motion, an employee must raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the
employer intentionally discriminated. The Third Circuit en banc, the
Seventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit en banc, and the Eleventh Circuit
hold employers to a lower evidentiary burden. The effect is that district
courts in these latter circuits, as a practical matter, are precluded from
granting an employer's motion for judgment based on insufficiency of
the evidence. The D.C. Circuit, having just heard this issue en banc,
stands ready to join the fray.
R. Alexander Acosta & Eric J. Von Vorys, Bursting Bubbles and Burdens of Proof: The
Deepening Disagreement on the Summary Judgment Standard in Disparate Treatment
Employment Discrimination Cases, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 207, 207-08 (1998); see also
Alice Marie Pettigrew, Comment, Employment-Aka v. Washington Hospital
Center: The District of Columbia Circuit Seeks Middle Ground in the Pretext-Only/Pretext-
Plus Debate, 29 U. MEM. L. REv. 863, 869-70 (1999) (identifying the position of the
First through the Eleventh circuits and District of Columbia). In yet another
article, the circuit courts' stance was different. SeeJessica Mollie Marlies, The Whys
of Lies and Vaughan v. Metrahealth: Can an Employer's Lie be Used to Make an Inference
of Discrimination , 77 N.C. L. REv. 2246, 2262-71 (1999).
2. See FED. R. CIv. P. 56, Summary Judgment. The nature of proof in age
discrimination cases is predominantly circumstantial. Because the standard for
summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law is virtually identical, this
article does not distinguish between summaryjudgment and judgment as a matter
of law when discussing the issues raised by the awkward fit of Rule 56 to disparate
treatment claims. See id.; see also Haynes v. Bee-Line Trucking Co., 80 F.3d 1235,
1238 (8th Cir. 1996) (outlining the standard for a ruling in a motion for a
judgment as a matter of law); Lynne C. Hermle, 27th Annual Institute on Employment
Law: Summary Judgment Motions in Discrimination Cases: Bringing, Defending and
Appealing, 592 PLI/Lrr. 1127, 1163-66 (1998).
3. 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
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of these cases.4
As a result, nearly every age discrimination case presents an issue of
material fact regarding discrimination that should preclude summary
judgment.5 Even so, defendants have an equal right to dispensation of
their claims on summary judgment where reasonable minds could not
ultimately infer discrimination. 6 This balancing of interests has in the past
and continues to create conflict within, and among, the federal circuit
courts.7
In 1997, the Eighth Circuit attempted to "unify and clarify [its]
understanding of the Supreme Court's standard" for summary judgment
in age discrimination cases in Ryther v. KARE 11.' The court recognized
that it had applied inconsistent standards in reviewing these kinds of
summary judgment motions and sought reconciliation by analyzing the
nature and scope of proof required in age discrimination cases.9 The
hope was that this opinion would resolve the historical conflict in the
Eighth Circuit on this issue.
In fact, the Ryther court, sitting en banc, produced an ambiguous
opinion." In it, nine judges concurred with the majority's analysis and
4. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).
5. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. But cf Acosta & Von Vorys,
supra note 1, at 230 ("There are many examples of cases that raise an [sic] genuine
issue of fact regarding the proffered reason but do not raise a genuine issue of fact
regarding discrimination.").
6. SeeJulie Tang & Hon. Theodore M. McMillian, Eighth Circuit Employment
Discrimination Law: Hicks and its Impact on Summary Judgment, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J.
519, 519-20 (1997) ("[C]ourts should not treat the issue of 'discrimination
differently from other ultimate questions of fact.'") (quoting Aikens, 460 U.S. at
716).
7. See sources cited supra note 1.
8. 108 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir. 1997).
9. See id. at 836 (stating that it is reviewing the standard in order to provide
"guidance to the bar and district courts").
10. See Tang & McMillian, supra note 6, at 538.
11. See Ryther, 108 F.3d at 844-51. Circuit Judges Lay, R. Arnold, McMillian,
Wollman, M. Arnold and Murphy concurred in the majority opinion in its entirety.
See id. at 832. Circuit Judges Fagg, Beam and Hansen concurred with Parts I, II
and III of the majority opinion, which analyzed and applied the standard for
judgment as a matter of law. See id. at 832, 835-845. Circuit Judges Fagg, Beam
and Hansen also wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part with
the majority opinion. See id. at 832, 847. CircuitJudge Loken dissented, joined by
Circuit Judges Bowman and Magill. See id. at 832, 847-51. Circuit Judges Fagg,
Wollman, Beam, Hansen, and Murphy concurred with Part IA of Judge Loken's
dissent. See id. at 832, 847-48. Part IA of Judge Loken's dissent addressed the
majority opinion's application of the Hicks standard of proof for summary
judgment. See id. at 847-48.
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result." Eight judges also concurred with the standard for summary
judgment the dissent applied in its analysis.13 While the dissent insisted it
applied the same standard as the majority,'4 this paper will show that in
application, this assertion is not true.'5 In fact, this paper will show that
the Eighth Circuit has consistently split on this issue, and continues to
apply diverging standards on what constitutes a material fact for purposes
of summary judgment.' 6
The dissent and majority standards are irreconcilable when applied
to the standard for summary judgment.' 7 In effect, the opinion created
two standards within the Eighth Circuit on motions for summary
judgment.18 Because the court is not unified in its approach on this issue,
subsequent panel opinions require different standards to invoke or
surpass summary judgment.' 9 Lower courts and the legal community
remain unsure of which standard to argue and apply to summary
20judgment motions. Until the U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari to
answer this question and end inter-circuit and intra-circuit confusion, the
Eighth Circuit must address the conflict within its own jurisdiction by
granting another hearing en banc to clarify the Ryther opinion.
This article briefly will discuss the standard of proof originally set
forth by the U.S. Supreme Court on this issue.2 It then will highlight the
conflict that arose within the Eighth Circuit post-St. Mary's Honor Center v.
HicksV 2 that prompted the need to clarify the Eighth Circuit standard set in
12. See id. at 834.
13. See id. at 834, 847-48.
14. See id. at 848. Judge Loken purported to agree with the court's
application of the legal standards but dissented as to the result it reached. See id.
15. See infra Part III, IV and V.
16. See infra Part III, IV and V.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V; see also Stanback v. Best Diversified Prods., Inc., 180 F.3d
903, 912 (8th Cir. 1999) (R. Arnold, J., concurring) (stating that since Ryther,
panels of the Eighth Circuit have gone both ways on the issue of whether the
plaintiffs offer of pretext alone will suffice to create a genuine issue of material
fact appropriate for jury resolution and thus survive summary judgment) (citing
Brandt v. Shop'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 108 F.3d 935 (8th Cir. 1997) and
Maschka v. Genuine Parts Co., 122 F.3d 566 (8th Cir. 1997)); Tang & McMillian,
supra note 6, at 538 ("Much depends on the particular judge or judges deciding
these difficult summary judgment issues, and the conclusions reached by different
judges as to whether an inference of discrimination is in genuine dispute will
inevitably vary.").
20. See infra Part V.
21. See infra Part II.A (discussing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-04 (1973)).
22. 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993); see also infra Part II.B.
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Ryther.13 Next, the article analyzes the Ryther opinion and its proposed
resolution to the conflict.2' The article then will address the confusion
Ryther caused in the legal community by analyzing some Eighth Circuit
decisions.2 5 Finally, this article suggests a solution to the post-Ryther split
within the Eighth Circuit by proposing alternative solutions that reconcile
the Eighth Circuit standard of proof for summary judgment in age
discrimination cases.2 6
II. BACKGROUND: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT STANDARD
Age discrimination cases such as Ryther often are classified under the
larger heading of disparate treatment claims.2 ' Disparate treatment
essentially amounts to less favorable treatment by an employer toward an
employee "because of the [employee's] race, color, religion, sex or
national origin."28  Cases alleging disparate treatment largely involve
circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence. 29 The U.S. Supreme Court, in
McDonnell Douglas v. Green,30 clarified the order and allocation of proof in
disparate treatment cases."
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See infra Part V.
26. See infra Part VI.
27. See Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. REv.
1579, 1580 (1996) ("Disparate treatment cases concern employment practices or
incidents that intentionally subject people to impermissible discrimination.")
[hereinafter Developments in the Law]; see also Tang & McMillian, supra note 6, at
520 n.9 ("The methodology for analyzing age discrimination disparate treatment
cases is the same as that which applies under Title VII.") (citation omitted). The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) was adopted in 1967, three years
after Title VII. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). The ADEA
makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
28. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
29. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)
("There will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental
processes.").
30. 411 U.S. at 792 (1973).
31. See id. at 800-01. The McDonnell Douglas opinion also addressed the issue,
in part, because:
The two opinions of the [Eighth Circuit] Court of Appeals and the
several opinions of the three judges of that court attempted, with a
notable lack of harmony, to state the applicable rules as to burden of
proof and how this shifts upon the making of a prima facie case.
2000] 1107
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A. The McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifling Approach
The McDonnell Douglas framework sets up a system of evidential
presentation in three phases.12 First, the plaintiff presents a prima facie
case of discrimination.n Second, once the plaintiff produces prima facie
evidence of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide
a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action.34 If the defendant produces a reasonable motivation, then the
Id. at 801 n.12.
32. See id. at 802-04. The McDonnell Douglas opinion specifically addressed a
Title VII action, although later courts have expanded this approach to include
ADEA claims. See e.g., Susan Childers North, Does Pretext Plus Age Equal the Sum of
the Judgment?, 31 U. RiCH. L. REv. 847, 851 nn.30-35 (noting that the U.S. Supreme
Court did not decide whether the McDonnell Douglas paradigm applied to ADEA
cases, but stating also that "it did not disparage the notion, despite the opportunity
to do so") (citing O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308,
311 (1996)).
33. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court set forth elements by
which a complainant in a Title VII action may present a prima facie case. See id.
They are:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants [sic] from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. In a later case, the Court noted this was not an "onerous" burden of proof. See
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Rather,
the prima facie case functions to eliminate common nondiscriminatory reasons for
termination. See id. at 253-54. The effect of the prima facie case is to create "a
presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee."
Id. at 254.
In an ADEA case, the elements are similar, with age replacing racial
minority. See O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 310-12 (listing the elements of the prima facie
case in a racial discrimination context and discussing what elements must be
shown in an age discrimination case to meet the elements of a prima facie case).
The O'Connor Court noted that in establishing a prima facie case for age
discrimination, the complainant need not prove that she was replaced by someone
outside the protected age group under the ADEA. See id. at 312. Rather, the
complainant must show that she was replaced by someone younger. See id.
34. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (implying that a non-discriminatory
reason is one that is reasonable). If the employer offers no reason, and remains
silent, the case is over, as there is no issue of fact remaining. See Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 254. However, once the defendant offers any explanation, that rebuttal must be
reasonably believable so as to create "a genuine issue of fact as to whether it
discriminated against the plaintiff." Id; see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, 507 (1993) ("'The defendant must clearly set forth, through the
introduction of admissible evidence,' reasons for its actions which, if believed by
the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the
1108 [Vol. 26:4
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presumption created by the prima facie case "drops from the picture.""
The burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who must provide evidence that
the defendant's proffered reason for the adverse employment action was
false and merely a pretext for discrimination.1
6
Cases following McDonnell Douglas raised a number of issues with the
burden-shifting process. 7 In Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, one issue was whether the plaintiff's proof of pretext necessitated
judgment in its favor as a matter of law.8 Circuit courts split, creating the
cause of the employment action.") (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-255 n.8). Cf
Developments in the Law, supra note 27, at 1590 (stating that "this second stage is
little more than a mechanical formality; a defendant, unless silent, will almost
always prevail. Both the credibility and the objective accuracy of the defendant's
proffered excuses are irrelevant"). There is some support for this view in Hicks,
509 U.S. at 510-11 (stating that the defendant must produce some evidence to
rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case, but that evidence need not be credible to
shift the burden back to the plaintiff) (emphasis added).
35. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11. To say that the presumption drops from the
case means simply that "[a] satisfactory explanation by the defendant destroys the
legally mandatory inference of discrimination arising from the plaintiffs initial
evidence." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10 (emphasis added). The evidence used to
establish the prima facie case may still be used in this third phase, but its use does
not automatically establish pretext. See id. Rather, the evidence may establish
pretext by the defendant, without further proof. See id.
36. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. In a subsequent case, the U.S.
Supreme Court re-analyzed the McDonnell Douglas approach. See Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 252-53; see also infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. In spite of the U.S.
Supreme Court's clarification of the third phase of the evidentiary process, this
proof of pretext analysis later caused a split within and among the circuits. See
Tang & McMillian, supra note 6, at 529-34 (discussing some general conclusions
regarding the Eighth Circuit standard for summary judgment and plaintiff's
burden in avoiding defendant's motion for summary judgment based on their
non-discriminatory decision to terminate the employee); see also Acosta & Von
Vorys, supra note 1, at 215-16 (analyzing the "pretext-only"/ "pretext-plus" debate
in terms of plaintiffs burden of proof required to discredit defendant's legitimate
and non-discriminatory reason for termination).
37. See e.g., Aikens, 460 U.S. at 713-16 (discussing the level of factual inquiry
required when defendant fails to rebut plaintiffs claim of facial discrimination);
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248 (addressing the nature of evidentiary burden placed upon
the defendant).
38. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248. Stated alternatively, the issue is whether
defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that its action was
based on a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. See id. at 250. In Burdine, a
female employee applied for a supervisory position within her division at Texas
Department of Community Affairs (TDCA). See id. at 250. The position remained
open for six months after she submitted her application. See id. TDCA later hired
a male for the position, and fired Burdine along with two other employees. See id.
at 251. TDCA later rehired Burdine for a position within another division, where
she received the same salary and responsibility levels as the supervisory position.
See id. Burdine filed suit, alleging that TDCA's failure to promote her and its
decision to later terminate her were based on gender discrimination. See id.
11092000]
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"pretext-only" and "pretext-plus" standards of proof. 9 Courts that applied
the "pretext-only" standard found that when the plaintiff produced
pretextual evidence, he or she did not need to produce any additional
evidence.4 The finding of pretext alone allowed the court to infer
discrimination and grant judgment as a matter of law in favor of the
plaintiff.
4 '
Other courts applied the "pretext-plus" standard. These courts
found that upon a showing of the falsity of the defendant's proffered
reason, the plaintiff must in addition prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that defendant's behavior was in fact motivated by intentional
discrimination.4 '  Thus, a finding of pretext alone did not necessitate
judgment in favor of the plaintiff.4 4 The U.S. Supreme Court addressed
this conflict in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.5
B. The Hicks Clarification of McDonnell Douglas
The Court addressed the specific issue raised by the inter-circuit split
The Court noted that the ultimate burden of proving intentional
discrimination remains with the plaintiff at all times. See id. at 253 (emphasis
added). When the defendant proffers a non-discriminatory reason for its
behavior, it need not also persuade the court that "it was actually motivated by the
proffered reasons." Id. at 254. Instead, the purpose of shifting the burden from
plaintiff to defendant and back to the plaintiff serves to narrow the ultimate issue
before the court. See id. at 255-56 n.8. ("In a Title VII case, the allocation of
burdens and the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a prima facie
case is intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual
question of intentional discrimination."); see also Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515 ("Nothing
in the law would permit us to substitute for the required finding that the
employer's action was the product of unlawful discrimination, the much different
(and much lesser) finding that the employer's explanation of its action was not
believable."). The Burdine Court further noted several reasons why defendant's
burden of production did not hinder the plaintiff. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258.
One reason was that the plaintiff must still be afforded a "full and fair
opportunity" to prove pretext for discrimination. See id. at 258.
39. See generally Tang & McMillian, supra note 6, at 524.
40. See Tang & McMillian, supra note 6, at 524. A majority of courts,
including the Eighth Circuit, used this standard before the Hicks decision. See id.
The Supreme Court itself did not agree on this issue. See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 717-18
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas framework requires
that a plaintiff prevail when at the third stage of a Title VII trial he demonstrates
that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason given by the employer is in fact not
the true reason for the employment decision).
41. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 260.
42. See Tang & McMillian, supra note 6, at 524.
43. See id. A "significant minority" applied this standard. See id.
44. See id.
45. 509 U.S. 502, 518 (1993).
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and the emerging "pretext-only" versus "pretext-plus" standards.16  It
specifically answered the question of whether a finding must be made in
favor of plaintiff if the trier of fact does not believe the employer's
proffered reason for the employer's action.4  In a 5-4 opinion, the Court
declared that the finding of pretext alone does not support a finding of
discrimination as a matter of law.4' The plaintiff always carries the burden
of persuasion to support its intentional discrimination claim. 49  This
burden is not relieved simply because the defendant's proffered reason is
unbelievable. °
The court indicated that the plaintiff need not produce additional
evidence specifically designed to support its claim of intentional
discrimination." The plaintiff may rely on its prima facie case, on its
proof of pretext, or it may produce additional evidence.2 Ultimately, the
trier of fact must find intentional discrimination. 3
The Hicks case came to the Court after a full bench trial and appeal
to the Eighth Circuit.54 Thus, the Court established its findings based on
evidence produced to a factfinder.5 This left open the possibility for
46. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text; see also Hicks, 509 U.S. at
502.
47. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 502.
48. See id. at 503 ("Any doubt created by a dictum in Burdine that falsity of the
employer's explanation is alone enough to sustain a plaintiff's case was eliminated
by Postal Service Bd. Of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983)."). That is,
"[t] he trier of fact's rejection of an employer's asserted reasons for its actions does
not entitle plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 502.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 511 ("[T]he factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by
the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of
mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to
show intentional discrimination.").
52. See id.
53. See id. at 518.
54. See id, at 505.
55. See id. The court did state in dictum that after the prima facie case and
defendant's burden of production are established, the court is asked to decide
whether an issue of fact remains for a factfinder:
None does if, on the evidence presented, (1) any rational person would
have to find the existence of facts constituting a prima facie case, and (2)
the defendant has failed to meet its burden of production-i.e., has failed
to introduce evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion
that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.
Id. at 509. The Court continued by stating that "[i]f the defendant has failed to
sustain its burden but reasonable minds could differ as to whether a
preponderance of the evidence establishes the facts of a prima facie case, then a
2000]
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conflict within and among the circuits, including the Eighth Circuit, of
how the Hicks standard applied to motions for summary judgment.
5 6
III. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT SPLIT POST-HICKS
In two notable opinions, the Eighth Circuit attempted to draw some
conclusions regarding the Hicks standard of proof as applied to motions
for summary judgment in disparate treatment cases.-7 In fact, these
opinions gave rise to a new split within the Eighth Circuit.
question of fact does remain, which the trier of fact will be called upon to answer."
Id. at 509-10 (emphasis added). The Court further noted that in the event that
the defendant carries its burden of production, then the McDonnell Douglas
framework is no longer relevant. See id. at 510. The Court specifically stated that
the trier of fact is called upon to make the ultimate finding of discrimination. See
id.
56. See Tang & McMillian, supra note 6, at 528-30. Further, some scholars
have noted that the language supplied by the Hicks Court was vague enough to
create a circuit-split on its interpretation. See Developments in the Law, supra note 27,
at 1593 ("The efficacy of Hicks as a vehicle to resolve intercircuit conflict seems
highly questionable, given the persisting division among the circuits....
Moreover, entirely new questions have arisen from the permissive reading of
Hicks."). See Acosta & Von Vorys, supra note 1, at 208-09 (stating that the passage
in Hicks is the source of confusion among circuits on "how [the McDonnell-
Douglas] burden-shifting scheme affects an employer's motion for judgment").
The exact quote under dispute is: "The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put
forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of
mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to
show intentional discrimination." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
57. See infra notes 55-78 and accompanying text.
58. In Kobrin v. University of Minn., 34 F.3d 698, 703 (8th Cir. 1994), the
Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff "may overcome summary judgment by
producing evidence that, if believed, would allow a 'reasonable jury to reject the
defendant's proffered reasons for its actions."' (quoting Gaworski v. ITT
Commercial Finance Corp., 17 F.3d 1104, 1109 (8th Cir. 1997)); cf. Krenik v.
County of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953, 958 (8th Cir. 1995) ("To survive summary
judgment at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff must
demonstrate the existence of evidence of some additional facts that would allow a
jury to find that the defendant's proffered reason is pretext and that the real
reason for its action was intentional discrimination."); see also Hutson v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 1995) (following Krenik);
Nelson v. Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc., 26 F.3d 796, 801 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating
that the employee "must do more than simply discredit an employer's
nondiscriminatory explanation; he must also present evidence capable of proving
the real reason for his termination was discrimination based on age").
Later, Circuit Judge McMillian specially concurred in the denial of the
suggestion for rehearing en banc of Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc. and wrote specially
to emphasize the panel opinion's use of the mixed-motive analysis set forth in
Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc., and relying upon Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997
F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1993). See Nelson v.J.C. Penney Corp., 79 F.3d 84, 85 (8th Cir.
1996). He noted that the panel's use of these cases "in what is purportedly a
1112 [Vol. 26:4
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A. Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp. 9
This age discrimination case came on appeal from the district court's
denial of defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law.60 In a
divided opinion, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding.1
It held that a reasonable jury could have found defendant's proffered
reason for termination was in fact pretext for discrimination.62
The majority relied upon Hicks and stated that "if (1) the elements of
a prima facie case are present, and (2) there exists sufficient evidence for
a reasonable jury to reject the defendant's proffered reasons for its
actions, then the evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to determine
whether intentional discrimination has occurred .... 63 The court held
that the jury verdict could not be overturned if there was any reasonable
basis for the jury's conclusion.64 In essence, the Gaworski majority gave
utmost deference to the province of the jury by applying the standard for
judgment as a matter of law strictly to the evidence before it.
65
The dissent stated that in order to prevail, the plaintiff needed to
pretext case, will cause continued confusion to the district courts and attorneys of
this circuit." Id.
59. 17 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 1994), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied,
(Apr. 20, 1994) (Fagg, Wollman, Beam, Loken and Hansen, Circuit Judges, would
grant the suggestion) (Bowman, Magill, Circuit Judges, took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case). Senior Circuit Judge Lay, who also wrote
the opinion in Ryther, wrote the opinion. See id. at 1106. Gaworski was a 55-year
old manager who alleged his termination was based on his age. See id.
Defendant's proffered reason was that Gaworski's termination was in fact a
product of a reduction in force policy. See id. at 1107. A jury found for the
plaintiff, and the district judge denied defendant's post trial motion for judgment
as a matter of law. See id. at 1106-07.
60. See id.
61. Seeid. at 1107.
62. See id. at 1110.
63. Id. at 1109. The court determined that sufficient evidence existed in this
case based on the findings that while ITT claimed a reduction in force, it showed
no evidence of a need for one. See id. at 1118 (Gibson, J., dissenting). Gaworski
was the highest paid and oldest employee, as well as the only one who was eligible
for pension benefits. See id. at 1107. Further, IT"s reason for retaining a younger
employee was pretextual, and in fact the younger employee replaced Gaworski's
position, for which Gaworski was more qualified. See id. at 1110.
64. See id. at 1108 (stating the standard of review from the denial of a motion
for judgment as a matter of law and noting that the court of appeal must "affirm
the denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law if reasonable persons
could differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence," and further
noting that the standard on review is "highly deferential").
65. See id. at 1110. Gaworski presented a prima facie case of age
discrimination, and enough evidence existed for a reasonable jury to reject
defendant's reasons, therefore the jury verdict should not be overturned. See id.
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present evidence not only of pretext, but specific evidence that intentional
discrimination motivated the termination. 66 The dissent analyzed the
findings in detail, and concluded that no reasonable jury could have
found that age motivated ITT's decision to terminate Gaworski.67
The Gaworski dissent stated that the majority placed too great a
weight on the initial prima facie case and its presumption of
discrimination. 6' The dissent found that when the defendant's proffered
reason withstands and the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove pretext,
Hicks maintained that the record must be viewed as a whole to determine
whether enough evidence exists to prove intentional discrimination. 69
The Gaworski case exemplifies the issue before the Eighth Circuit in
reviewing motions for summary judgment. The Hicks Court, while
clarifying a narrow issue, did not directly address the brewing conflict
within the Eighth Circuit. That is, if the plaintiff proves a reasonable
prima facie case of discrimination, and the defendant proffers a
reasonable, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, what constitutes a
"full and fair opportunity" for the plaintiff to prove pretext for
discrimination? 70 Because five of the sitting judges would have considered
a rehearing en banc on this case, one may infer that a split had emerged
within the Eighth Circuit at this point.71 The Eighth Circuit again faced
the opportunity to clarify its position in Rothmeier v. Investment Advisors,
Inc.
72
66. See id. at 1120 (Gibson,J., dissenting).
67. See id. at 1122.
68. See id. at 1117-18.
69. See id. at 1117.
70. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text on the McDonnell Douglas
requirement that plaintiff receive a full and fair opportunity to prove pretext for
discrimination.
71. See Kehoe v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 96 F.3d 1095, 1102 (8th Cir. 1996)
("[D]ecisions subsequent to Gaworski have been careful to emphasize that the
Supreme Court in Hicks mentioned, even where the employee has refuted the
employer's proffered reasons for the adverse employment action, the plaintiff
cannot prevail unless he has introduced 'evidence that will suffice to show
intentional discrimination.'") (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 511 (1993)); see also Boatmen's Bancshares v. Nelso, 26 F.3d 796 (8th Cir.
1994) ("[Elvidence that an employer's proffered nondiscriminatory explanation is
wholly without merit or obviously contrived might serve double duty."). The
"double duty" scenario exists where the proof of pretext both discredits the
defendant's proffered reason and permits an inference of intentional
discrimination. See id. The court in Boatmen's Bancshares held that in all other
cases, the plaintiff "must do more than simply discredit an employer's
nondiscriminatory explanation; he must also present evidence capable of proving
that the real reason for [the adverse employment action] was discrimination based
on [a prohibited criterion]." Id.
72. 85 F.3d 1328 (8th Cir. 1996).
1114 [Vol. 26:4
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss4/7
RYTHER V. KARE 11
B. Rothmeier v. Investment Advisors, Inc.73
In Rothmeier, the Eighth Circuit squarely addressed the issue of proof
at the summary judgment stage. 4 It noted the inconsistency in the Eighth
Circuit, post-Hicks, on this issue, and specifically attempted to reconcile
Gaworski.75
The court stated that "[w] e believe that Hicks allows a trial judge to
decide on a motion for summary judgment that the evidence is
insufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to infer discrimination even
though the plaintiff may have created a factual dispute as to the issue of
pretext." 76 Instead, the court concluded that "the rule in this Circuit" is
that a plaintiff could avoid summary judgment only if it (1) produced
evidence of pretext sufficient to create a fact issue; and (2) created a
"reasonable inference" that age discrimination was the motivating factor
for termination.77
The court found that Rothmeier did not produce sufficient evidence
for a factfinder to conclude that discrimination was a determinative factor
in the decision.78 However, some later courts have cited Rothmeier only for
the narrow proposition that summary judgment will be granted only when
plaintiff's proof of pretext is inconsistent with or wholly unsupportive of
73. Circuit Judges Bowman and Loken, and District Judge Schwarzer sat on
the panel. See id. at 1330. Note that in Gaworski above, Bowman declined to
participate in that decision, and Loken would have granted a rehearing en banc.
See Gaworski, 17 F.3d at 1104.
74. See Rothmeier, 85 F.3d at 1331. In this case, Rothmeier was the president of
Investment Advisors, Inc. (IAI) from 1989, when he began working at IAI, until his
termination in 1993. See id. at 1330. He was 43 years old when hired, and 46 when
terminated. See id. Rothmeier claimed that he was terminated because IAI wanted
to cover up some SEC problems that Rothmeier knew about. See id. at 1337. He
alleged that because he was older, he was more ethical and would have told
someone about the cover-up. See id. The District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of IAI, because "the record was 'bereft of any suggestion that
there was any age based animus involved in the decision of IAT ... to terminate
Rothmeier."' Id. at 1331.
75. See id. at 1336 ("Post-Hicks, our Circuit's pronouncements on this issue
have not been models of apparent consistency."). The court noted that Gaworski
could be reconciled by interpreting it solely to mean that "[i]n some cases,
evidence that an employer's proffered nondiscriminatory explanation is wholly
without merit or obviously contrived might serve double duty; it might serve the
additional purpose of permitting an inference that age discrimination was a
motivating factor in a plaintiff's termination." Id. (quoting Boatmen's Bancshares,
26 F.3d at 801).
76. Id. at 1335.
77. See id. at 1336-37.
78. See id. at 1337.
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discrimination. 79 Other courts have cited Rothmeier for much more than
this limited proposition.0
The conflict between these two cases remained apparent, even after
Rothmeier attempted to reconcile them. The issue pre-Ryther could be
summarized as follows: where the plaintiff produces evidence of pretext
that is not inconsistent with discrimination, can summary judgment be
granted even though the showing of pretext creates a contradictory
inference from defendant's proffered reason for termination?81 In other
words, may a court sit as factfinder at summary judgment and weigh
evidence to determine whether a jury ultimately may find intentional
discrimination?
IV. RYTHER V. KARE 1112
A. The Facts
In Ryther, a sportscaster sued a television station, alleging KARE 1 l's
refusal to renew his contract violated the ADEA.83 KARE 11 stated that
Ryther's low ratings in market research prompted the adverse business
814decision. Ryther alleged the termination was in fact based on his age-
he was fifty-three years old when he left KARE 11. The primary issue at
79. See Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 837 n.4 (8th Cir. 1997); Keathley v.
Ameritech Corp., 187 F.3d 915, 922 (8th Cir. 1999), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied,
(Sept. 20, 1999).
80. SeeYoung v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 152 F.3d 1018, 1022-23 (8th Cir.
1998); Widoe v. District No. 111 Otoe Cty. Sch., 147 F.3d 726, 729 (8th Cir. 1998);
see also Morris v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 1509, 1526-27 (D. N.D.
1996).
81. One of the sources of confusion may be that in mixed motive and
reduction in force cases, direct proof of discrimination is required. See Radabaugh
v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 448 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Nelson v. J.C.
Penney Co., 79 F.3d 84, 85 (8th Cir. 1996) (Circuit Judge McMillian specially
concurring in the denial of suggestion for rehearing en banc). While the correct
standard was ultimately applied, Judge McMillian noted in his concurrence in the
denial of suggestion for rehearing en banc that the panel opinion in the earlier
Boatman's Bancshares, Inc. case relied upon dicta that "will cause confusion to the
district courts and attorneys of [the Eighth] circuit." Id. The panel opinion in
Boatman's Bancshares, Inc. relied upon mixed motive cases in stating the standard
for review, even though the allegation was clearly age discrimination and the Hicks
burden-shifting approach should have been used. See Nelson v. Boatman's
Bancshares, Inc., 26 F.3d 796, 800 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing that panel's use of
Radabaugh).
82. 108 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1119 (1997).
83. See id. at 834.
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trial was whether KARE l's proffered reason for termination was in fact
pretext for age discrimination against Ryther. 6
B. The Decision
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Ryther" The district judge
denied KARE 1l's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law."" In
denying defendant's motion, the court reviewed the evidence presented at
trial and concluded that a reasonable jury could have found for the
plaintiff based on the evidence presented. 9
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order.9°
86. See id.
87. See id. at 834.
88. See id.; see alsoRytherv. KARE 11, 864 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Minn. 1994). The
district court's opinion in Ryther provides an excellent analysis of the burden-
shifting evidentiary analysis in light of a motion for judgment as a matter of law.
See id. at 1516-19.
The court stated the elements of the prima facie case as follows: "Ryther
must show that: (1) he was within the protected age group, (2) his job
performance was satisfactory; (3) his contract was not renewed; and (4)
defendants assigned a younger person with no better credentials to do the same
work." Id. at 1516-17 (citing Haglof v. Northwest Rehabilitation, Inc., 910 F.2d
492, 493 (8th Cir. 1990)). According to the lower court opinion, KARE 11
contended in part that Ryther did not even establish a prima facie case for age
discrimination. See id. at 1517. This issue was not raised again on appeal. See
Ryther v. KARE 11, 84 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir. 1996). Defendant argued that because
Ryther did poorly in market ratings, he did not perform his job satisfactorily. See
Ryther, 864 F. Supp. at 1517. Judge Doty dismissed this argument as irrelevant to
the prima facie showing, stating rather that this argument went to defendant's
business decision for terminating Ryther and noting that Ryther produced
sufficient evidence to find his performance was satisfactory. See id. Defendant
further alleged that Ryther did not meet the fourth prong of the above-listed test,
because he was not replaced by a younger person. See id. However, the court
found that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ryther, a reasonable
jury could find that Jeff Passolt replaced Ryther by "assuming his former duties as
lead sports anchor." Id.
89. See Ryther, 108 F.3d at 834-35; Ryther, 864 F. Supp. at 1519. Among the
evidence used to make this determination were the findings that the station
decided not to renew Ryther's contract before the market research was conducted;
Ryther's duties changed and were given to younger people at the station; despite
positive performance reviews, Ryther was not given feedback in his performance
reviews to suggest there were any deficiencies in his work; the market research
conducted was designed against Ryther's favor; and evidence suggesting age bias
in his workplace. See Ryther, 108 F.3d at 835-36; Ryther, 864 F. Supp. at 1519.
90. See Ryther, 84 F.3d at 1076 (Judge Lay writing for the majority) (Judge
Loken dissenting). The panel opinion on Ryther gives clear insight into the
dichotomy of the latter Ryther en banc opinion, as Judge Lay wrote the majority for
andJudge Loken wrote the dissent for both the panel and en banc opinion. See id.
In his majority opinion, Judge Lay focused primarily on the deference given to the
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KARE 11 then moved for, and was granted, rehearing en banc on the issue
of whether Ryther failed as a matter of law to present sufficient evidence
of age discrimination to the jury.9' In a divided opinion, the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the district court's order again, finding sufficient
evidence to support the jury's verdict.
92
C. The Majority Opinion
The majority attempted to detail the Eighth Circuit's standard for
deciding motions for judgment as a matter of law in age discrimination
cases.93 In essence, it renewed the analysis set forth in Gaworski.94
Central to its discussion was (1) the application of the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting approach and the Hicks analysis to the facts before
the court,95 and (2) that evidence in light of the standard for judgment as
a matter of law.96
plaintiff on review of a jury verdict. See id. at 1078. He noted that the record on
review is considered in the light most favorable to Ryther, all conflicts in the
evidence are resolved in Ryther's favor, and the court must give Ryther the benefit
of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the facts. See id.
Keeping this extremely high burden in mind, the majority concluded that "[t]he
plaintiff produced overwhelming evidence as to the elements of a prima facie case,
and strong evidence of pretextuality, which, when considered with Ryther's work
environment's indications of age-based animus, clearly provide sufficient evidence
as a matter of law to allow the trier of fact to find intentional discrimination." Id.
at 1086-87.
On the other hand, Judge Loken's dissent is just as adamant about the
lack of showing of a submissible case of age discrimination. See id. at 1090-92
(Loken, J., dissenting). He averred that either judgment as a matter of law, or at
the least a new trial should be granted KARE 11. See id. at 1092.
91. See Ryther, 108 F.3d at 834. The Eighth Circuit granted a rehearing
because they "deem[ed] this issue to be the significant claim on appeal, and in
order to clarify the standard to be followed in this circuit in age discrimination
cases." Id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 835. Note that this analysis applies equally to summaryjudgment
motions.
94. See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text. Under dispute in earlier
Eighth Circuit opinions (and the opinions of other courts of appeal) was the
notion that once a defendant offered a reason for discharge, plaintiffs burden was
simply to prove that reason was pretextual, or false. See Rothmeier v. Investment
Advisors, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1996). If a plaintiff could prove this
falsity, many courts believed that the plaintiff was then entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
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1. Application of the McDonnell Douglas Standard
The majority quoted Hicks to mean that, in the third stage of the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting process, plaintiffs evidence of pretext
may serve two duties. First, the evidence challenges defendant's proffered
reason for termination. Second, the evidence may support a reasonable
inference of discrimination. 7 Notably, the court emphasized the U.S.
Supreme Court's dictum in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,98 that
"[w]hen all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been
eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely
than not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some
reasons, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as
[age] .99
The majority found support in the Third Circuit's opinion in
Sheridan v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co.100 The Third Circuit opinion
often has been cited in support of the "pretext-only" view of evidence at
the summary judgment stage.10' However, the majority in Ryther did
acknowledge, where Sheridan did not, that there are some circumstances
where plaintiffs proof of pretext alone will not suffice to permit an
inference of age discrimination.1 02  The court narrowed these
97. See Ryther, 108 F.3d at 837. "We emphasize that evidence of pretext will
not by itself be enough to make a submissible case if it is, standing alone,
inconsistent with a reasonable inference of age discrimination." Id. "[T]he
plaintiff must still persuade the jury, from all the facts and circumstances, that the
employment decision was based upon intentional discrimination." Id. at 837-38.
In a footnote to this statement, the court explained further: "It is not enough, in
other words, to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiffs
explanation of intentional discrimination." Id. at 838 n.5 (quoting St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993)).
98. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
99. Ryther, 108 F.3d at 836 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 43 U.S. at
567, 577 (1978)). The Ryther majority used this quote to support its analysis of
finding intentional discrimination. See id. However, a look at the context of the
original quote shows that the U.S. Supreme Court, when it made this
pronouncement, spoke in terms of the prima facie case. See Furnco Constr. Corp.,
438 U.S. at 577. This means simply that the elimination of other plausible reasons
for the defendant's employment decision is not the same as an affirmative finding
of discrimination, nor should it be construed so. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 514-15.
100. See Ryther, 108 F.3d at 836-37
101. See PAUL W. MoLucA, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N CENTER FOR CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON AGE DISCRIMINATION: SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES: RECENT CASE LAw ABOUT DISPARATE
TREATMENT, HARASSMENT, AND REASONABLE ACCOMODATION (1998); see also Hermle,
supra note 2, at 1154-54.
102. See Ryther, 108 F.3d at 837 n.2 (citing Rothmeier Inc. v. Adusas, Inc., 85
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circumstances to cases like Rothmeier, where the evidence of pretext is
inconsistent with age discrimination. 3
The majority's analysis is summarized as follows: where the plaintiff
presents sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case and offers
evidence of pretext that is not inconsistent with a finding of intentional
discrimination, the evidence may permit a jury to find for the plaintiff.
°0 4
While the plaintiff must still prove discrimination, this finding is for the
jury, not the court.105
2. The Standard for Judgment as a Matter of Law
The majority placed great emphasis on the province of the jury to
106weigh the evidence and find discrimination. It reiterated the U.S.
Supreme Court's standard, stating that "[o]nly where there is a complete
absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached does a
reversible error appear."1 °7 The court further noted that it does not stand
in the shoes of the jury and reweigh evidence, nor does the court interject
its own opinion of the outcome into its analysis.0 If the court finds
conflicting evidence from which a reasonable jury could find
discrimination, the jury verdict must be upheld.'9
D. The Dissenting Opinion
Eight of the twelve then-active Eighth Circuit judges concurred with
the dissenting opinion in Ryther." ° In essence, the dissent renewed the
Rothmeier analysis within the facts of Ryther."'
The dissent declared that it agreed with the standards the majority
applied, but that on the facts of the Ryther case, KARE 11 should have
prevailed. 2 In fact, the dissenting opinion simply reiterated the Rothmeier
analysis above,'1 3 which differs from both Gaworski and the Ryther
103. See id. at 837-38 n.4.
104. See id. at 844.
105. See id. at 844. Again, this analysis applies equally to summary judgment
and judgment as a matter of law, since the standards of proof are similar. See id. at
837.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 845 (quoting Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946)).
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id. (Loken,J., dissenting).
111. See id. at 848.
112. See id.
113. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
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majority. T
1. Application of the McDonnell Douglas Standard
The dissent cited Hicks for a different proposition than the
majority." It found that Hicks held only that plaintiff's proof of pretext
does not compel a finding for plaintiff."6 The opinion emphasized the
importance of finding intentional discrimination in fact, and of not
treating discrimination cases differently from other kinds of cases."' The
dissent concluded its analysis of Hicks by inferring that the majority's
interpretation of the Hicks language was "implausible," and reiterated the
U.S. Supreme Court's admonition "not to dissect the sentences of the
United States Reports as though they were the United States Code." 18
The dissent also challenged the soundness of Sheridan (and thus
indirectly undermined the majority's reliance on that opinion)." 9 It
stated that the Eighth Circuit has consistently held against the Sheridan
viewpoint, finding judgment as a matter of law appropriate in
circumstances "even if plaintiff has some evidence of pretext[,] if that
evidence, for one reason or another, falls short of proving intentional
discrimination."
20
2. The Standard forJudgment as a Matter of Law
The dissent summarized its view of the Eighth Circuit standard as
follows:
[w]hile plaintiff may rely on the same evidence to prove both
114. See supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text for Gaworski analysis; see supra
notes 93-108 and accompanying text for Ryther majority analysis. The Ryther
dissent states that Rothmeier is the law of the Eighth Circuit. See Ryther, 108 F.3d at
848 (citing the majority opinion at Part II, final paragraph as confirming this
statement). But see id. at 838. However, the majority and the dissent seem to
interpret the meaning of Rothmeier differently. Compare id. at 837 ("[w]e
emphasize that evidence of pretext will not by itself be enough to make a
submissible case if it is, standing alone, inconsistent with a reasonable inference of
age discrimination"), with id. at 848 n.13 (Loken, J., dissenting) ("[A] trial judge
may decide on a motion for summary judgment or JAML that the evidence is
insufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to infer unlawful discrimination, even if
plaintiff has presented some evidence of pretext.").
115. See Ryther, 108 F.3d at 848.
116. See id.
117. See id.
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pretext and discrimination, that evidence must be sufficient to
prove that the employer is guilty of intentional discrimination.
Therefore, a trial judge may decide on a motion for summary
judgment or [udgment as a matter of law] that the evidence is
insufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to infer unlawful
discrimination, even if plaintiff has presented some evidence of
pretext. We review rulings on such motions under our




One of the issues raised with these conflicting analyses is the
attention given to the fact-finder's role. The majority inferred that the
evidence must go to the jury in all cases where pretext is not inconsistent
.... 122
with discrimination. This analysis gives great weight to the prima facie
case and the evidence of pretext. 13 The burden-shifting process itself thus
necessarily creates a genuine issue of material fact for a jury.24 The jury
alone weighs evidence and credibility, pursuing the ultimate question of
intentional discrimination. 12-
The dissent relied on the continued validity of summaryjudgment in
age discrimination cases and the business judgment of the defendant.
26
The dissent gave less deference to the evidence presented through the
burden-shifting process.' 27  Instead, it focused primarily on finding
intentional discrimination, and stated that the court may dismiss a case on
summary judgment if it does not find intentional discrimination at that
stage.128
The majority did not disagree with the dissent's emphasis on finding
intentional discrimination. 1 9 As discussed below, the main difference was
in the weight given to the evidence presented during the burden-shifting
process. That is, the courts disagreed on the stage at which a conclusive
finding of intentional discrimination must be found.3
0
As a result of the Ryther opinion and its continued reliance on the
121. Id. at 848 n.13. Note that this language is identical to Rothmeier's
language. See supra notes 71 and 76 and accompanying text.
122. SeeRyther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 837-38 nn.2-6 (8th Cir. 1997).
123. See id.
124. See supra notes 34-36.
125. See Ryther, 108 F.3d at 837-38.
126. See id. at 848 (Loken,J., dissenting).
127. See id. at 848-49.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 837-38.
130. Compare id. at 837-38, with id. at 848.
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pre-Ryther schools of analyses, the Eighth Circuit has split again, this time,
on the meaning and interpretation of Ryther.
V. APPLICATION OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT STANDARD POST-RYTHER
The Eighth Circuit split actually re-characterizes the pre-Hicks inter-
circuit division of the "pretext-only" and "pretext-plus" standards.'"' The
bottom line is what constitutes a "reasonable inference" of discrimination
for summary judgment purposes.
A. The "Pretext-Only" Standard
The "pretext-only" view espoused by the Ryther majority holds that
summary judgment in favor of the defendant will prevail only when the
plaintiffs proof of pretext is inconsistent with intentional discrimination.
In every case where the plaintiff produces evidence that reasonably rebuts
131. Applying the "pretext-only"/"pretext-plus" labels to this analysis requires
some explanation. By "pretext-plus," the analysis means to point out that in
reviewing motions for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law, this
standard gives less deference to resolving all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See
id. at 848-49. A "pretext-plus" analysis would mean that the plaintiff, at the
summary judgment stage, must produce sufficient evidence of discrimination to
create a genuine issue of material fact as to the discrimination issue in order to
continue to trial. See id. The plaintiff would not need to produce additional
evidence of discrimination, but may be precluded from going to trial on the merits
if she does not produce enough evidence. See id. This standard gives great
discretion to the court, which both makes findings of fact and weighs evidence at
the summary judgment stage. See id. at 849. In addition, a court that applies the
"pretext-plus" standard may be more apt to give deference not to the plaintiffs
claims, but rather to the defendant's business judgment in terminating the
employee. Therefore, summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law for the
defendant will be affirmed more often using the "pretext-plus" analysis.
To the contrary, the "pretext-only" analysis would resolve all inferences in
favor of the plaintiff, and more likely than not will reverse summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law where there is any possibility that the circumstantial
facts create a genuine issue of material fact as to the employer's reason for
terminating the employee. See id. at 836. If any does arise, the resolution must be
left for the trier of fact (i.e., the jury) to resolve. See id. at 837. In a "pretext-only"
analysis, the parties do not create a genuine issue of material fact only in those
circumstances where plaintiff s proof of pretext is inconsistent with discrimination.
See id. at 837-38. In all other cases, if the plaintiff produces some valid evidence
that raises an eyebrow at defendant's proffered reason for termination, the
"pretext-only" analysis will find that it is an issue of fact for the jury to decide. See
id. at 83940. In sum, the "pretext-only" judges place more emphasis on the role of
the factfinder, who listens to testimony and weighs the parties' evidence regarding
termination, where the "pretext-plus" judges place more emphasis on the value of
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the defendant's proffered reason for termination that does not contradict
a finding of discrimination, the conflicting inferences raise a genuine
issue of material fact and the evidence must be weighed by a trier of fact.
The "pretext-only" view does not discount an ultimate finding of
intentional discrimination. It merely states that the finding of
discrimination is one for the trier of fact, not the court.1 32 Therefore, the
"pretext-only" view hastens to encroach on the province of the jury and
reserves summary judgment only for those cases where no reasonable
factfinder could infer discrimination.
13 3
B. The "Pretext-Plus" Standard
The "pretext-plus" view espoused by the Ryther dissent implies that if
plaintiff's proof of pretext somehow falls short of a reasonable inference
of discrimination, summary judgment may be granted.3 4  This view
supports the contention that the finding of discrimination is no different
than any other issue of fact presented to the court on summary judgment.
The "pretext-plus" position looks at the record as a whole to
132. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
133. The "pretext only" view seems to find some basis of support in Justice
Rehnquist's statement in Furnco Constr. Corp., 438 U.S. at 577 ("When all legitimate
reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the
employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we generally
assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible
consideration such as race."); see also Maschka v. Genuine Parts Co., 122 F.3d 566,
568 (8th Cir. 1997) (Judge R. Arnold penning the opinion, with Judges Bowman
and M. Arnold). Judges R. Arnold and M. Arnold concurred with the Ryther
majority in its entirety, while Judge Bowman concurred with the Loken dissent in
its entirety. See Ryther, 108 F.3d at 834. In Maschka, the unanimous court relied on
Ryther, stating that:
[t] he holding of that case may be summarized as follows: if a prima facie
case is made, and if the plaintiff offers evidence tending to show that the
defendant's proffered reasons for its decision were not the real reason,
then the jury may decide the case, unless the "evidence of pretext... is,
standing alone, inconsistent with a reasonable inference of age
discrimination."
Maschka, 122 F.3d at 571. However, this is not the rule of Ryther. This analysis
harkens back to the pre-Hicks view espoused by the Eighth Circuit, that the
plaintiff must merely prove pretext in some form, and the issue will be submitted
to the factfinder to weigh the evidence. See id. The only amendment to the pre-
Hicks statement, according to Maschka (and in reliance on its reading of Ryther) is
that it determines that "[o] nce an age-discrimination plaintiff has done as much as
Maschka [and present evidence that is not inconsistent with a finding of age
discrimination], ajury may (but need not) find for him." Id.
134. See Ryther, 108 F.3d at 848 (Loken,J., dissenting).
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determine whether a finding of discrimination ultimately may be made.
This requires a higher standard of proof for the plaintiff at the summary
judgment stage.' 36  The plaintiff must prove pretext as well as.... 137
discrimination. This view does not hold that additional evidence must
be produced to prove discrimination. It does state that plaintiff's
rebuttal evidence of defendant's proffered reason does not in itse/fcreate
a genuine issue of material fact.
39
However, with this "pretext-plus" view, the court does not seem to
resolve all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. In fact,
the court itself sits as the trier of fact, weighing evidence and making
conclusions based on the evidence. Where the "pretext-only" view gives
great deference to the jury, the "pretext-plus" view gives deference to the
employer's business decision-making process.140
C. Eighth Circuit Cases Post-Ryther
In Brandt v. Shop'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc.,'41 decided just weeks
after Ryther, two judges reversed a jury's verdict in favor of an employee,
while one dissented.14 The majority opinion applied the "pretext-plus"
view.'43 The court found that the employee's evidence was not sufficient
to maintain a judgment in her favor.144 The court concluded that "[a]n
employer's business decision concerning hiring need not be a good
decision to withstand a challenge for sex discrimination. 45  That is,
although the plaintiff produced evidence of pretext,'4 the court found it
135. See id. at 849.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 848 n.13.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 850-51.
140. There is less support for this contention within the Eighth Circuit, as well
as in other circuits. See supra Part V.A and notes 132-33.
141. 108 F.3d 935 (8th Cir. 1997), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied,
(May 6, 1997) (Chief Judge R. Arnold, Judges McMillian and Hansen would grant
the suggestion).
142. See id. at 939. Judge Wollman concurred with the Ryther majority in its
entirety, while Judges Bowman and Heaney did not sit on the Ryther panel. See id.
143. See id. at 937. Brandt sued based on gender discrimination, alleging that
Shop'n Save hired a male meat cutter over her, even though her qualifications
were higher and she had more education than the male candidate. See id. at 936-
37.
144. See id. at 936-37.
145. Id. at 938. That is, even though the facts do not suggest a motivation
contrary to, or inconsistent with, discrimination, the facts do not support
discrimination either. As the majority stated, the jury's finding could not be
sustained because there is insufficient evidence to support it. See id.
146. See id. at 937.
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insufficient to avoidjudgment as a matter of law.'
Given the Ryther majority's strong preference for upholding jury
verdicts where reasonable minds could reach differing results, 4 8 it may be
inferred that if the "pretext-only" view would have been applied, the jury
verdict would have been upheld.'
49
The Brandt dissent favored this approach. 50 It stated that if the proof
was inconsistent with intentional discrimination, the trier of fact cannot
infer discrimination.' Therefore the dissent would have affirmed the
lower court'sjudgment.5 2 However, as the dissent points out, the majority
"speculate [d]" as to the employer's actual motivation and in essence
reweighed the evidence to overturn the jury's verdict.' 53
In Kneibert v. Thomson Newspapers, Michigan Inc. ,' decided
approximately six months later, the court affirmed summary judgment in
favor of the employer.1 5 The panel opinion again split.' 6 The majority
applied the "pretext-plus" view, and held that Kneibert did not establish a
connection between his demotion and his age."' Therefore, summary
147. See id. at 938.
148. SeeRyther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d, 832, 845 (8th Cir. 1997).
149. That is, when looking at the evidence presented in this case, some judges
in the Eighth Circuit may find that since the evidence did not contradict a finding
of discrimination, the jury was free to infer discrimination from the facts
presented. See id.
150. See Brandt, 108 F.3d at 939-41 (HeaneyJ., dissenting).
151. See id. at 941. Judge Heaney follows the majority's reasoning in Ryther,
that where the plaintiff produces evidence of pretext and evidence of
discrimination (which may or may not be the same evidence), there is sufficient




154. 129 F.3d 444, 456 (8th Cir. 1997), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc
denied, Oan. 7, 1998) (Chief Judge R. Arnold, Judges Theodore, M. Arnold, and
Murphy would grant the suggestion). Judges Bowman, Gibson and M. Arnold sat
on the panel. See id. at 448. Judge M. Arnold filed a partially dissenting opinion.
See id. at 456 (M. Arnold, J., partially dissenting).
155. See id. at 448.
156. See id. at 444, 456.
157. See id. at 454. The Kneibert majority cites Ryther for two important
propositions. First, the Eighth Circuit rule that in order for an employee's action
to survive summary judgment, the evidence must (1) create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the employer's reasons for its actions were pretextual,
and (2) create a "reasonable inference" that discrimination was the determinative
factor for the employer's action. See id. at 452. Second, the majority quoted Ryther
as stating that "evidence of pretext will not by itself be enough to make a
submissible case if it is, standing alone, inconsistent with a reasonable inference of
age discrimination." Id. at 454 n.6. However, the Kneibert court misapplies the
words of the Ryther majority. What Ryther stated was that a plaintiff must persuade
1126 [Vol. 26:4
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judgment should stand in favor of the employer.""
The dissent, in contrast, stated that the rule in Ryther was that unless
the evidence was inconsistent with discrimination (and the evidence here
was not), the judgment should stand.'5 9
In 1998, in Vaughn v. Roadway Express, Inc.,' 60 the Eighth Circuit again
published a divided opinion in an age-discrimination case.' 6' Again, the
majority applied the "pretext-plus" view to uphold summary judgment in
favor of the employer. 62 The plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence
to create a reasonable inference of age discrimination.6
Espousing the "pretext-only" standard, the dissent stated that in
the jury that the employment decision was based on intentional discrimination. See
Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 837-38 (8th Cir. 1997). Ryther did not state that
this is appropriate at the summary judgment stage, nor did it imply it, based on its
deference to the jury. See id.
158. See Kneibert, 129 F.3d at 454-55. In support of this conclusion, the majority
found that the problems between the plaintiff and defendant had to do with their
business relationship, not Kneibert's age. See id. In support of finding that
Kneibert did not establish a connection between his demotion and his age, the
court cited the proposition that "[flederal courts do not sit as a super-personnel
department that reexamines an entity's business decisions." Id. at 454 (quoting
Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1994)). However, an
examination of the court's opinion shows the court doing exactly that. See id. at
455-56.
159. See id. at 456 (M. Arnold, J., dissenting). Judge M. Arnold dissented
because he believed that the majority "has incorrectly applied the principles...
announced in Ryther." Id. The Kneibert dissent cited Ryther for the "pretext-only"
proposition that where the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case and produces
evidence of pretext, as long as the pretextual reason is not inconsistent with
discrimination, the jury must be given a change to weigh the evidence. See id.
More pointedly, Judge M. Arnold stated that "Kneibert is not asserting that he is
entitled to summary judgment ... [only] that [the defendant] is not entitled to
summary judgment." Id. This point is precisely where the Eighth Circuit split
stands today.
160. 164 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1998), reh'gand reh'gen banc denied, (Feb. 8, 1998).
161. See id. at 1087-88 (Judges M. Arnold, Gibson and DistrictJudge Nangle sat
on the panel). Judge M. Arnold filed a dissenting opinion. See id. at 1092 (M.
Arnold, J, dissenting).
162. See id. at 1090-91. The court outlined the evidence raised by the
employee (including that Vaughn's falsification of computer data produced more
accurate results than the company's computer program, that the new data did not
harm his employer or benefit the employee, that the company's lack of discipline
toward other employees did not extend to him in a less grievous situation, and
other evidence of general age bias), and articulated that it was insufficient. See id.
However, rather than allow a jury to weigh this evidence, it appears that the
majority seems to apply the rule that where there is no direct evidence of
discrimination per se, or where the evidence itself does not point to one
conclusion (that being discrimination), summary judgment is proper. See id.
163. See id. at 1091.
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applying Ryther to these facts, the judgment should have been reversed.
64
The dissent cited Ryther, and stated that where the plaintiff presents a
prima facie case, and presents evidence of pretext that is not inconsistent
with discrimination, the trier of fact should be allowed to weigh the
165
evidence and find discrimination.
The issue arose again in 1999, in Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc.166 The
majority opinion affirmed summary judgment for the employer on the
basis that the plaintiff could not provide direct evidence of
discrimination. 67 However, as the dissent correctly pointed out, direct
evidence is not the only means by which a plaintiff may prove
discrimination in disparate treatment cases. 1
D. Stanback v. Best Diversified Products, Inc."
This recent opinion of the Eighth Circuit highlights the growing
conflict within the circuit on this issue. While all of the judges on the
three-member panel concurred in the result that favored summary
judgment for the defendant, each wrote separately to express
disagreement with the analysis that supported that conclusion. 70 Circuit
Judge Richard Arnold applied the "pretext-only" view, while CircuitJudge
Hansen applied the "pretext-plus" position. 71
The "pretext-only" position supported by Judge Richard Arnold
differs from the Stanback majority's formulation of the burden-shifting
process under McDonnell Douglas.72  The majority stated that "[i]f the
employer meets [the] burden of production, then the plaintiff must show
that the employer's proffered reason is pretextual, and that discrimination
164. See id. at 1092. Implied in Judge M. Arnold's dissent is that the plaintiff
does not need to produce, at the summary judgment stage, actual evidence of
discrimination as long as the prima facie case and evidence of pretext that is not
inconsistent with discrimination are present. See id. Since Vaughn did present
evidence not inconsistent with discrimination, summary judgment should have
been denied. See id.
165. See id. (citing Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836-37 (8th Cir. 1997)).
166. 169 F.3d 1131 (8th Cir. 1999).
167. See id. at 1136.
168. See id. at 1139 (M. Arnold,J., dissenting).
169. 180 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 1999).
170. See id. at 911-13. Circuit Judges R. Arnold, Hansen and District Judge
Perry sat on the panel. See id. at 903. Judge R. Arnold concurred only in the
court's judgment applying the "pretext-only" view. See id. at 912-13 (R. Arnold, J.,
concurring). Judge Hansen concurred and applied the "pretext-plus" position.
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'was the real reason' behind the discharge decision. Judge Arnold
disagreed. He interpreted Ryther to mean that:
once the plaintiff has introduced evidence that, if believed,
would justify a rational jury in finding that the reason given by
the employer was not the real reason, the plaintiff will always
(with an exception not here relevant) be able to survive
summary judgment, or to get her case to the jury, as the case
may be.'
74
That is, the plaintiff does not need to prove intentional
discrimination at the summary judgment stage. He or she need only
produce evidence that would create a genuine issue of material fact for a
jury. The trier of fact must always make the ultimate finding of
discrimination.
In a separate concurrence, Judge Hansen applied the "pretext-plus"
view to disagree with this analysis. Judge Hanen stated that "[i]n Ryther,
eight of the then active judges of the court (including [Hansen]) joined
in Part I.A. of Judge Loken's dissenting and concurring opinion which
rejected the argument that evidence of pretext is enough to defeat an
employer's summaryjudgment motion.
" 176
This statement seems to propose that the standard in the Ryther
dissent reflects the Eighth Circuit view on this issue, not the Ryther
majority opinion.' 7 However, many of the same judges that concurred
with the majority opinion also concurred with the dissent's standard.
Which is the standard to apply in the Eighth Circuit?
173. Id. at 908.
174. Id. at 912. Judge R. Arnold noted that courts have gone both ways on this
issue (citing Brandt v. Shop'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 108 F.3d 935 (8th Cir.
1997) and Maschka v. Genuine Parts Co., 122 F.3d 566 (8th Cir. 1997)). See id. (R.
Arnold, J., concurring).
175. See id. at 912-13.
176. Id. at 912.
177. See id. Judge Hansen proposed this again in McCullough v. Real Foods,
Inc., 140 F.3d 1123 , 1128 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Loken's dissent, Ryther v.
KARE 11, 108 F.3d, 832, 848 n.13 (8th Cir. 1997) as the standard the Ryther court
articulated en banc). The exact quote is stated in Part IV.D.2 of this note. This is
a tricky play on words, and seems to invoke a greater degree of precedent than is
afforded a dissenting opinion. Judge Hansen implies, in fact, that the dissent,
rather than the majority opinion, is the law of the Eighth Circuit. See McCullough,
140 F.3d at 1128. This is not the case. See Brandt, 108 F.3d at 939 (opinion by
Judge Bowman) (citing the Rytherdissent, and noting in a parenthetical thatJudge
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According to Judge Hansen, in order for an employee to survive
summary judgment, she must show pretext for discrimination.' This is the
"pretext-plus" view. According to Judge Arnold, in order for an employee
to survive summary judgment, she must simply introduce evidence of
pretext that creates an issue of material fact.' 7
While the difference in standards applied did not affect the outcome
of the Stanback decision, 8 ° in closer cases the "pretext-only"/ "pretext-
plus" view makes all the difference in surviving summary judgment. Some
Eighth Circuit district courts have expressed discomfort with the Eighth
Circuit's precedent since Rothmeier and Ryther'' Further, other courts and
scholars have disagreed about the meaning of Ryther1
82
178. See Stanback, 180 F.3d at 912-13.
179. Seeid. at912.
180. See id. While judge Hansen disagreed with the "pretext-only" standard as
explicated by Judge Arnold, he concurred in the judgment nonetheless. See id.
181. See, e.g., Raddatz v. Standard Register Co., 31 F. Supp.2d 1155, 1160 (D.
Minn. 1999) ("Eighth circuit opinions subsequent to Rothmeier contain somewhat
differing articulations of when or how often the prima facie case plus pretext
evidence is sufficient alone to create an inference of discrimination."); Graham v.
Rosemount, Inc., 40 F. Supp.2d 1093, 1099 (D. Minn. 1999) ("In short, under
Eighth Circuit precedent, it is not clear whether the double-duty scenario
addressed in Rothmeier and Ryther should be considered the exception or the
norm.").
182. For example, one analysis suggested by the District of Columbia Circuit in
Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1998), is that Ryther
stands for the proposition that "there are at least some situations in which genuine
issues of material fact as to the falsity of the employer's explanation will not suffice
alone to avoid summary judgment." The Aka court distinguishes the Ryther
approach from that in Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061
(3d Cir. 1996), which it believes stands for the proposition that "a plaintiff can
always succeed in fending off summary judgment if he can demonstrate a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the employer's stated reason for its
employment decision is the real reason." Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289. Note that the
actual language supplied in Sheridan does not support this finding. See Sheridan,
100 F.3d at 1066-67 ("We have understood Hicks to hold that the elements of the
prima facie case and disbelief of the defendant's proffered reasons are the
threshold findings, beyond which the jury is permitted, but not required, to draw
an inference leading it to conclude that there was intentional discrimination.")
This language in Sheridan directly contradicts the stated language in the
Ryther opinion. The majority opinion in Ryther explicitly finds support for its view
in Sheridan, stating that the Third Circuit case sets forth the same standard and
interpretation of Hicks that the majority does in Ryther. See Ryther, 108 F.3d at 836-
37. However, the court in Ryther did state explicitly what Sheridan did not, namely,
that "evidence of pretext does not always support an inference of intentional
discrimination." Id. at 837 n.2.
In one article, the author interprets a portion of the majority opinion in
Ryther to mean that the Eighth Circuit adopts the "pretext plus" standard simply
because the majority noted that "[t]his is not to say that, for the plaintiff to
succeed, simply proving pretext is enough." North, supra note 32, at 864 (citing
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VI. AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION
Some courts and scholars have noted that applying labels to these
two standards causes confusion.'8 3 As one article notes, the question really
Ryther, 84 F.3d at 1078).
In another, the author proposes that Rytherstands for the proposition that
the prima facie case together with evidence of pretext will usually preclude
summary judgment. See Hermle, supra note 2, at 1158. This article continues by
pointing out that Ryther is consistent with other circuits that will usually but not
always find summary judgment precluded where the plaintiff presents a prima
facie case and where the plaintiffs evidence of pretext creates a genuine issue of
material fact. See id.
Yet a third author, in an article co-written by Eighth Circuit Judge
Thomas McMillian, points out that Ryther stands for a number of things, not the
least of which is that "in order to make a submissible case for the jury, the plaintiff
is not required to produce direct proof of discrimination." Tang & McMillian,
supra note 6, at 536.
The Tang article espouses four important implications of Ryther on the
disposition of issues arising in the summary judgment context. See id. at 535-36.
First, Ryther supports the Rothmeier holding. See id. at 536. Second, Ryther reaffirms
that the plaintiff is not required to produce direct proof of discrimination in order
to make a case for the jury. See id. Third, Ryther outlined and underscored the
uncontroverted principles behind the role of the jury versus that of the judge. See
id. at 536. Fourth, the facts of Ryther establish some standards for cases at the
summaryjudgment stage. See id.
One practitioner implies confusion in even determining which part of the
opinion carries more precedential weight. See MOLLICA, supra note 101 (citing
Ryther for the proposition rather than the majority's holding). In his discussion of
the Eighth Circuit pretext standard, Mollica explains the majority opinion and
notes that eight judges out of 12 joined this part of the opinion. See id. He then
points out that a different group of eight judges also joined in separate partial
concurrences. See id.
This confusion is indicative of the conflict surrounding the Ryther case.
When others reading the opinion must scratch out a head count in order to
determine what view controls in the Eighth Circuit, regardless of the existence of a
majority opinion, resolution is in order.
183. See Tang & McMillian, supra note 6, at 524-26. For a more detailed
analysis of how each circuit stands on the standard of proof in summary judgment
cases concerning disparate treatment, see Hermle, supra note 2, at 1151-63;
MOLLICA, supra note 101, at Part B.
As one scholar notes, the best way to reconcile the courts' view on the
standard is to "rate the courts' receptiveness to Hicks' permissive passage."
Developments in the Law, supra note 27, at 1602 n. 89. The "permissive passage" of
which this author writes is the infamous Hicks passage: "The factfinder's disbelief
of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is
accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the
prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination." St. Mary's Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
However, this approach is not conclusive. According to one court, the
Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits apply the "pretext-only"
standard. See Waldron v. SL Indus. Inc., 849 F. Supp. 996, 1004-05 n.Il (D. N.J.
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may be how deeply the courts involve themselves in determining whether
the record supports a finding of discrimination.'84
That is, some courts will leave any conflicting inferences to the trier
1815of fact for resolution. These courts generally will allow a case to go to
the trier of fact to determine discrimination, as long as the plaintiff
presents a genuine issue of material fact with its evidence of pretext in the
prima facie case.' 6
Other courts require a review of the record as a whole to determine
whether the employer's proffered reason for its action masks its true
motivation-that of intentional discrimination.' 8'
Any categorization of courts into "camps" necessarily comes up short.
There is no real way to document a given court's interpretation of Hicks in
any meaningful way in order to make predictions or create categories into
which future cases may fall. Not only do the sheer numbers of disparate
treatment claims make such an analysis administratively burdensome, the
nature of the claim is almost entirely fact-sensitive.
The best that one could hope for in a circuit court's analysis is
application of the uncontroverted standard for summary judgment to
disparate treatment cases, keeping one eye on judicial economy and two
eyes on the vital role of the jury in resolving issues of fact.
A. The Standard for Summary Judgment and Ryther
The different approaches discussed in the preceding paragraphs
have important implications in conjunction with summary judgment
motions. The standard for summary judgment is clear. The court
resolves all conflicting inferences in the light most favorable to the non-
1994). Another scholar notes that the Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits all apply
the "pretext-plus" standard. See North, supra note 32, at 861-66.
184. See MOLLICA, supra note 101, at Part A (noting, however, that "it is
devilishly tricky to pin down where the circuits are on this issue").
185. See id. at Part B. The article cites the Third, Sixth and Ninth Circuits for
this proposition. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id. The article notes that the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth and Eighth
Circuits all require this heightened review of the evidence. See id; cf. Mullin v.
Raytheon Co., 2 F. Supp.2d. 165, 169 (D. Mass. 1998). "In the Second, Seventh,
Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, if a genuine issue of material fact as to
pretext exists at the summary judgment stage, the fact that an employer's
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse job action may be pretextual
is sufficient to carry the case to thejury." Id. at 169 n.2; see alsoJudith Olans Brown
et al., Some Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment Discrimination Law: A
Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487, 1524 (1997)
(noting that in the First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits, however, the simple existence
of this factual issue is not sufficient, of itself, to ward off summaryjudgment).
1132 [Vol. 26:4
30
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol26/iss4/7
RYTHER V. KARE 11
moving party.'88 It then must determine whether reasonable minds could
differ in the conclusions drawn from the evidence.' 9
If deference is given to the plaintiff's evidence and the province of
the jury, the Ryther majority view should prevail. Summary judgment
generally should not be granted as long as the evidence of pretext does
not contradict discrimination. In those cases it is quite clear that no
reasonable fact-finder could infer discrimination.
However, if deference is given to the defendant's proffered reason,
its business judgment and the ultimate finding of discrimination, the
Ryther dissent view should prevail. Summary judgment should generally
be granted in those cases regardless of whether evidence of pretext does
not support a finding of discrimination. In these cases it is clear that
plaintiff has not met the required burden of persuasion.
The Ryther majority and dissent both agree that the necessary
conclusion drawn in age discrimination cases is one of intentional
discrimination.' 9 However, because of the circumstantial nature of the
evidence in age discrimination cases, conflicting inferences naturally arise.
This raises the difficult issue of balancing the plaintiff's right to have ajury
weigh evidence and credibility against the defendant's right to procedural
efficiency.
VII. CONCLUSION
Because the issues raised by this conflict create uncertainty in the
legal community, a resolution is in order. If the goal is to reserve judicial
resources for those cases where the plaintiff produces sufficient evidence
of discrimination to conclusively prove its case, then the court should
188. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 47 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not
those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary
judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the non-movant is to
be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.
Id.
189. See id. A genuine issue of material fact exists where reasonable juries
could find for either the plaintiff or the defendant. See id. ("[T]he plaintiff, to
survive the defendant's motion, need only present evidence from which a jury
might return a verdict in his favor.").
190. See Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 837-38 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that
the plaintiff must persuade the jury "that the employment decision was based
upon intentional discrimination"); see also id. at 848 (concurring that the
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adopt the "pretext-plus" view. That is, the court should give deference to
the defendant's business-decision making process. It should deny
summary judgment only in those cases where the court, by weighing the
evidence, is able to predict that the plaintiff will ultimately prevail. This is
not, however, consistent with the policy of summaryjudgment.'9'
A better approach would be to adopt the "pretext-only" standard, as
modified by the Ryther majority. That is, where the plaintiff produces
evidence of pretext that is not inconsistent with or wholly unsupportive of
a finding of intentional discrimination, the case should survive summary
judgment. This does not undermine the ultimate finding of
discrimination. It does, however, provide the plaintiff with a "full and fair
opportunity" to prove pretext for discrimination, as suggested in
McDonnell Douglas.192
In employment discrimination cases, the evidence presented is
predominantly circumstantial. This does not suggest that summary
judgment should be granted so sparingly that unmeritorious claims get to
a jury.
However, unless and until the U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari
to resolve the awkward fit of Rule 56 to the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting presentation of proof, the Eighth Circuit should adopt the
modified "pretext-only" standard. The Eighth Circuit must give equal
deference to the role of the factfinder to weigh the evidence and
determine whether the employer did in fact intentionally discriminate
against the employee. This is the standard drawn from McDonnell Douglas,
Hicks, and their progeny.
191. See supra Part V.A and accompanying notes.
192. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
1134 [Vol. 26:4
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